

# **‘JOINED UP PEACEMAKING’**

## **Justice Africa’s Approach to Peace Activities in North-East and Central Africa**

May 2001

### **Overview and Summary**

The achievement of peace and security is one of the most complex challenges facing those concerned with Africa. This paper provides an overview and framework for analysis for peace-related activities, and the role of Justice Africa’s initiatives and programmes.

Justice Africa is engaged with a range of peace-related activities, primarily in the Horn and Great Lakes regions. Although these activities may appear disparate and ad hoc, they are in fact bound together by a single vision and strategy. The basic principles of our work are:

1. *Sustained commitment*: JA’s directors have each spent the majority of their adult lives working on these issues in these countries. Our collective network and understanding is unparalleled. There is no alternative to this protracted engagement and the understanding that it brings.
2. *Credibility and coherence*: our response to each situation is founded upon a deep and long-standing engagement with the country. Each situation demands a response based upon such an understanding and engagement, that makes sense within the context of each country’s particular history and political culture.
3. *Connectedness*: we seek to link up the different levels of peace work and to connect activities in different countries of the region. This is possible through working at different levels and through our network throughout the region.

Among Justice Africa’s ongoing peace and security-related work we can enumerate the following:

1. At an *international level*: we provide advice various international initiatives concerned with peace and security in the subregion to the UN, other international organisations, and governments. Our briefings are highly regarded in the international policy-making community.
2. At a *regional level*: we convene an ongoing consultation group consisting of governmental and civil society participants that meets to discuss the most pressing issues of peace, security, humanitarianism and related issues, bringing in the OAU and other regional organisations. We work closely with the OAU and ECA to engage them with

issues that we consider important; for example we are actively engaged with the ECA's African Development Forum initiatives on HIV/AIDS and regional economic integration.

3. At a *subregional level*: we undertake advisory work for IGAD and its Sudan Peace Secretariat. With our partners we are also engaged in supporting subregional organisations and their interface with civil society.
4. At a *national level*: we have an ongoing engagement with the parties to the conflict in Sudan to draw up proposals on the modalities and substance of peace. We are also engaged with the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda on issues of conflict and security. For example we have been asked to organise public debates on national security in Ethiopia and Rwanda, and we maintain active and critical dialogue with all the governments of the region. We also have a number of country-specific initiatives.
5. At a *civil society level*: we provide support to a range of organisations and networks that support peace-related activities throughout the region, sponsoring dialogue, facilitating exchanges, etc. The 'Civil Project in Sudan' is one such active network of civil society organisations that we sponsor. We also have a research and publishing programme that promotes new thinking, using methodologies for writing and consultation that promote substantive debate around fundamental issues. We believe that this investment in intellectual capital is an important contribution to creating dialogue and consensus around key issues.
6. At a *grassroots level*: our programmes include training judicial officers and human rights monitors in Sudan; and providing education on human rights and constitutional issues in Eritrea. Through our partner organisations we also support civic education in Ethiopia and Rwanda.

The problems of the north-east African subregion are compounded by the highly significant political, economic and cultural divides that cut across the subregion, which are themselves important contributors to conflict, and which also mean that each conflict has its own dynamics and demands its own specific response. Meanwhile the high level of militarisation in the subregion means that there are few opportunities for the systematic engagement of stakeholders in peace. For this reason it is important that peace-related activities within the region are supported by an organisation based externally, that can achieve an overview of the entire subregion, and can help to mobilise broad-based international coalitions in support of national and subregional activities.

Our experience underlines the importance of strengthening institutions, by working with them, supporting their capacities, and linking them. North-east Africa's subregional institutions are weak, but hold out some potential, which must be enhanced. Although it is often frustrating, with large inputs of effort for relatively small outcomes, we continue to work closely with the OAU and IGAD, among others.

We believe that it is possible to make north-east and central Africa into a stable and peaceful region. But this will not be easy: it will take time, commitment and expertise. Justice Africa's projects, operating at different levels with different groups of stakeholders, aim to contribute to creating a consensus on the core values of mutual tolerance and peaceable settlement of disputes. We hope this can be a contribution towards the creation of a peaceful and democratic order.

## Dimensions of Conflict

This section attempts to provide a broad overview of conflicts in Africa, with an aim to identifying possible modalities for intervention by a range of actors. It takes for granted an understanding of the extent of conflict in Africa and its complexities, and does not undertake a scholarly critique of existing literature. It provides a background framework of analysis for Justice Africa's ongoing activities with regard to peace and related issues in North-East and Central Africa.

The aim of this section is to develop a simple organising framework that can provide the basis for examining:

- (a) The range of contributory factors in creating war and escalating or continuing war;
- (b) The roles of various institutions and stakeholder groups in preventing and resolving conflict, and ensuring that once peace is achieved, conflict does not recur.

The added value of this section is its attempt to *identify linkages* between different levels at which conflict occurs, different stages in the conflict cycle, and different components of conflict. These linkages operate both in conflict causation and in effective response. This relates directly to the Justice Africa aim of developing a connected approach to peace-related activities.

This and the following section aim to isolate important roles that can be played by civil society organisations and regional institutions, and in particular the roles that the two can play in coordination with each other. This relates to the particular role that we have identified for Justice Africa and which we are developing for the organisation.

*The causes of conflict* are complex and occur at many different levels, ranging from the individual factor in leaders to wider issues of political ethnicity, control over resources, etc. None of these factors can be discounted. All must be considered. The particular challenge for those seeking to prevent or resolve conflicts is to cover all these different factors. This calls for a multiple approach, involving different institutions and stakeholders, to address these different components. However, recognising the dangers of multiple peace initiatives and of uncoordinated peace-related efforts, it is also vital to link these different levels together.

We can identify three main stages of the *conflict cycle*, with corresponding elements of for conflict management:

- (a) The underlying factors that create conflict—conflict prevention and peace-building;
- (b) War itself—conflict resolution;
- (c) The post-conflict period—management of post-conflict transitions.

The *main components of conflict creation and escalation* can be schematically organised under three main headings: military, political and economic.

*Military factors* include, among others: the security calculations, both rational and irrational, of leaders on all sides; the nature of the army; the militarisation of society, and the response to any outbreak of violence. When war has actually broken out, military factors become more high-profile and salient, as leaders seek to mobilise human and material resources for war, and calculate whether they can gain a decisive military advantage over their adversary. Purely tactical military calculations may become the driving force in the

development of a conflict, superseding any political reasons for the outbreak of conflict, and revising war aims upwards. Post-conflict, factors such as the effectiveness of disarmament and demobilisation measures and the demilitarisation of politics are key to the success of peace agreements. There are strong indications that the most important factor determining the likelihood of a conflict breaking out is the military history of the country: where there has been a war before, and former war-leaders are in power, war is more likely. The second most important factor is the presence of conflict in a neighbouring country.

*Political factors* include: the nature of political control over state power, the extent to which the government includes effective representation of all groups in society, government responses to the expressed grievances of constituencies, the manipulation of political ethnicity or politicised religion, the felt need for those in power to appear strong and decisive, struggles for control of party or military apparatus, etc. A particular concern is the nature of liberation movements once in power: these kinds of government, which occur in many parts of Africa, appear particularly prone to engaging in renewed conflict. When conflict has broken out, the political dynamic changes, and the conduct of the conflict itself can become the most salient political issue. Questions such as the degree of resoluteness in pursuing popular war aims, the level of conscription and the level of loss of human life, perceived competence in conducting the war, the deployment of ethnic, nationalist or religious ideology, human rights abuses and humanitarian questions, all become new factors in the political equation. As human losses and financial expenditures mount, the political demands of the adversaries tend to harden and heighten. Regional factors may become salient as neighbouring states are drawn in, as belligerent parties, as hosts for refugees or rebel groups, as diplomatic allies, or as mediators.

*Economic factors* include: control over natural resources, perceived benefits of control over state power, especially in winner-takes-all political systems (and penalties of not gaining such control), the commercial benefits of using violence to acquire physical assets, and the weakness of constituencies that have vested interests in peace and security. During conflict, certain groups and individuals prosper: although peace will bring a net economic gain for a country, it does not necessarily follow that those in charge of the war effort on either side will gain. In post-conflict periods, the economic factor can become the most important. Peace agreements need to be underwritten by economic rehabilitation programmes, targetted at various levels: the state, local government, essential service provision, rehabilitation of former combatants, etc. There are some indications that the single most important factor in a peace agreement actually holding is the personal financial interests of the former war leaders.

Conflict has its own logic. It is important to distinguish between conflict prevention and conflict containment and resolution. Once an armed conflict has broken out, the military logic of war supersedes the political logic of peacetime. As Clausewitz noted, war tends to the absolute. Thus a war that has broken out for a particular reason tends to escalate, bringing in other issues and factors as well. The demands of a post-conflict transition are different again. All these elements are of course inter-related: perhaps the most common cause of conflict is a failed post-conflict transition.

In this context it is striking to note how little of the recent military history of north-east and central Africa has actually been written. Most of those who have been engaged in the wars are reluctant to write, so that their analyses must be filtered through others. One of Justice Africa's activities is obtaining relevant information on this history.

All the above factors operate at different levels. These range from the individual and community to the international level. Each level has its own dynamics, distinguished by the nature of the actors involved, the institutions available for organising violence or for mediating conflict, and the salience of the issues at stake.

## Responses to Conflict: A Multi-Dimensional Model

Turning to the tools we have to respond, we can distinguish: the community/ grassroots level, the civil society/private sector level, the national political level, the regional level, and the international level. These levels can of course be sub-divided, but this simplified categorisation appears useful. The following three tables indicate some of the measures that are possible at different levels, addressing different components, and at different stages in the conflict cycle. The listing of measures is not exhaustive in any way, but merely indicative.

### (a) *Conflict prevention and peace-building*

	<i>Military</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Economic</i>
Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Teaching of non-military values in schools.</li> <li>* Small arms control.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Maintenance of effective dispute resolution mechanisms.</li> <li>* Empowerment of women.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Management of common resources in a way so as to minimise conflict potential.</li> <li>* Provision of work, education opportunities for youth.</li> </ul>
Civil society/ private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Engagement of civil society stakeholders in public debate on security issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Promotion of civil and political rights, transparency and good governance.</li> <li>* Inclusion of all constituencies, promotion of gender equity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* NGO promotion of service provision, sustainable development.</li> <li>* Good corporate citizenship.</li> </ul>
National political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Limited use of emergency measures.</li> <li>* No proliferation of special forces or militias.</li> <li>* Transparency about military spending.</li> <li>* Civilian control of the military.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Equitable representation of different ethnic/religious groups in government.</li> <li>* Devolution of powers.</li> <li>* Respect for constitutionalism.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Adequate remuneration for soldiers, including health care and pensions.</li> <li>* Limitations on military spending.</li> <li>* Controls on military involvement in commerce.</li> </ul>
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Creation of credible regional intervention forces.</li> <li>* Development of national security doctrines to promote predictability and transparency in inter-state relations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Promotion of norms of good governance, utilising peer pressure.</li> <li>* Establishment and development of regional fora for dialogue and dispute management.</li> <li>* Regional civil society organisations also have roles in this regard.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Functioning of regional mechanisms and institutions for e.g. management of shared riparian resources, cross-border pastures.</li> <li>* Promotion of intra-regional trade</li> </ul>
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Development of credible international intervention forces.</li> <li>* Training for military, police, security services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Enhancement of conflict early-warning and timely intervention systems.</li> <li>* Support to civil society initiatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Increased predictability, mutual accountability in aid relations.</li> <li>* Increased support to key social sectors.</li> </ul>

(b) *Conflict resolution*

	<i>Military</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Economic</i>
Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* For local conflicts, traditional moral restraints on conflict can be invoked.</li> <li>* For national conflicts, less is possible.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* For local conflicts communities can invoke adapted traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.</li> <li>* For national conflicts, little can be done.</li> </ul>	
Civil society/ private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* For local conflicts, civil society initiatives are possible.</li> <li>* For national conflicts, very little is possible.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Human rights monitoring.</li> <li>* Advocacy for peace (where possible).</li> <li>* Promotion of dialogue across conflict lines, e.g. contact with counterpart groups on the 'other side.'</li> <li>* Promotion of dialogue on post-conflict issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Provision of assistance to people affected by war.</li> <li>* Observance of business codes of conduct, especially regarding human rights.</li> </ul>
National political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Ceasefire, augmented by mechanisms for monitoring.</li> <li>* Mechanisms for separation of forces, creation of security zones, encampment, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Proximity talks; preparatory talks, high-level talks, adoption of common values and principles: all the modalities for mediation available, either bilateral, facilitated or mediated.</li> <li>* Political liberalisation, opening up space for civil society.</li> <li>* Increased respect for human rights.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Avoidance or minimisation of military involvement in commerce.</li> </ul>
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Restrictions on arms flows, prohibition on use of military bases in neighbouring countries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Measures to contain the conflict and prevent its spreading to neighbouring countries.</li> <li>* In regional conflicts, the range of peace initiatives outlined above.</li> <li>* Facilitation or mediation of peace talks of various kinds.</li> <li>* Regional CSOs can support or augment national CSO efforts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Monitoring and controlling illegal export of commodities from the affected country.</li> <li>* Assistance to refugees, combined with protection, demilitarisation of refugee camps etc.</li> </ul>
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Monitoring adherence to IHL.</li> <li>* Arms embargoes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Carrots and sticks to encourage the parties towards negotiation.</li> <li>* Support to community-based and civil society initiatives.</li> <li>* Facilitation or mediation of peace talks.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Humanitarian assistance.</li> <li>* Monitoring and controlling illegal export of commodities from the affected country.</li> <li>* Advance planning for post-conflict economic rehabilitation and recovery.</li> </ul>

(c) *Management of post-conflict transition*

	<i>Military</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Economic</i>
Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants.</li> <li>* Local control of small arms supplies.</li> <li>* Humanitarian mine action.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Reconciliation between formerly hostile communities.</li> <li>* Rebuilding of judicial institutions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Rehabilitation of essential services.</li> </ul>
Civil society/ private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Assistance to veterans' associations to become articulate and responsible members of civil society.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Promotion of democracy, human rights etc., including active participation in rebuilding institutions.</li> <li>* Promotion of reconciliation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Support to social service provision, income-generating projects, micro-credit etc.</li> <li>* Engagement in policy debate and monitoring of post-conflict rehabilitation programmes.</li> </ul>
National political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Creation of a depoliticised national army.</li> <li>* Establishment of a comprehensive nationwide programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Establishment of democratic procedures and institutions.</li> <li>* Civilianisation of national political life.</li> <li>* Rebuilding national institutions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Development of plans for rehabilitation of war-stricken areas, return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs, economic reintegration of demobilised former combatants, and relaunching the economy.</li> <li>* Development of new financing schemes for rehabilitation.</li> </ul>
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Provision of peace-keeping forces as appropriate.</li> <li>* Monitoring adherence to military protocols in peace agreements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Supporting and monitoring implementation of peace agreements.</li> <li>* Promotion of regional civil society initiatives and networks.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Assistance for refugees to return.</li> <li>* Promotion of regional integration, cross-border trade and other measures.</li> </ul>
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Provision of peace-keeping forces as appropriate.</li> <li>* Monitoring adherence to military protocols in peace agreements.</li> <li>* Support (financial and technical) to military reform and demobilisation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Institutional support to key ministries, departments for reconstruction.</li> <li>* Engagement in policy dialogue to promote democratisation and reconciliation plans over a realistic time frame</li> <li>* Support to civil society initiatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Sequenced economic assistance to support transition from conflict through rehabilitation to growth/development.</li> <li>* Providing conditionality-free assistance to rehabilitation and recovery plans through trust funds and similar initiatives.</li> <li>* Accelerated debt relief.</li> </ul>

It is evident that planning for post-conflict transitions should begin even while conflicts are still underway. This will make it possible to exploit effectively the opportunities that arise during the first months of a post-conflict transition, putting in place effective policies and programmes. There is a danger that if these critical moments are missed—because policymakers are simply too busy with pressing concerns—important issues will

remain unresolved. Early planning and constituency-building on post-conflict issues will facilitate smooth transitions. In addition, it is possible that serious and concrete planning for peace may help to focus the belligerents' minds on the benefits of peace, and help to mobilise pro-peace constituencies in the countries concerned, thereby hastening peace itself. This requirement for planning ahead reflects a more fundamental reality: conflict has become a fact of life in many parts of Africa and cannot be regarded as an aberration. *Planning for peace must be a long-term strategic affair.*

One of the major challenges is to link up the many different components of peace-building, peace-making and post-conflict transitions. At the very minimum, activities in different areas should not impede or contradict one another. Hopefully they should augment and complement each other, creating *joined-up peacemaking*.

For some actors in war, there is political and economic logic to their activities. They can be losers in peace. There is a danger in single-track national-level peace processes, that they legitimate the belligerent leaders, providing them with a profile that they might not otherwise gain. On the other hand, there is a danger in multi-track processes, of 'forum-shopping' which allows war-makers to escape from the discipline of a peace track and search for alternatives, perhaps as a ruse for keeping the war going. In such situations, the best approach is a single national-level peace track, but complementary processes at other levels that build up local, civil, national, regional and international stakeholders in peace, thereby restricting the opportunities for a war-maker to pursue a bellicose strategy. This is the biggest challenge for joined-up peacemaking.

A second major challenge is the *regionalisation of conflict*. African wars have recently displayed a disturbing tendency to spill over borders, and embroil neighbouring states. For a number of key conflicts in Africa, notably the Great Lakes and Sierra Leone, peacemaking needs to be pursued at a regional level.

A third major challenge arises from the fact that—despite the regional dimension—all conflicts are *politically local*. To resolve them and keep them resolved requires an approach that is dictated by local realities, practices and sensitivities. There are no simple blueprints that can be utilised. Wider principles concerning, for example, the rapid respect for political freedoms or the introduction of economic liberalisation, may have to be tempered in the light of local political realities. Reducing the size of the army and civil service may be a priority for international financial institutions seeking to reduce the fiscal deficit, but this may conflict with more urgent needs to accommodate former adversaries within the state system. The scheduling and timing of the different component parts of peace-making and post-conflict transitions calls for political sensitivity and judgement of the highest order.

Among international partners, different institutions have comparative advantages in their specialist areas. For example, there is general specialisation of defence ministries in military affairs, foreign relations in political affairs and development cooperation in economic affairs. However, the division of labour is not that simple. A foreign ministry is better able to deal with national, regional and international issues than it is with civil society and community-based issues. Thus there is a strong rationale for a specialisation that provides development cooperation departments with a lead role when it comes to supporting peace-related civil society initiatives. In addition, many issues have cross-cutting implications. Notably, disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of former combatants is an issue that has military, political and economic aspects, and is salient at the national, civil society/private sector and community levels. (It may also have regional implications.)

Among African institutions, there are also comparative advantages. The OAU has a degree of political legitimacy that can be crucial in ensuring that an agreement sticks. However its capacities remain limited. The incipient analysis in the table implies that the OAU, in partnership with other regional organisations, can play a key role as a facilitator in



synthesising actions at different levels and establishing linkages between different organisations.

Subregional organisations have emerged as the premier peace enforcers in the continent. The UN continues to play a pivotal role in certain conflicts. As yet there is no institution in Africa devoted to strategic planning concerning the social and economic components of conflict and post-conflict transitions. This is a potential role for the ECA in coordination with subregional organisations and the Bretton Woods institutions.

## **Civil Society Engagement with Peace**

This section introduces two categorisations. The first concerns the different kinds of mobilisation that are possible, and the second relates to the kinds of political system that exist and the possibilities for creating pressure for peace under the existing constraints. This is an analysis that broadly informs Justice Africa's approach to engagement with stakeholders in peace, and the promotion of peace-related activities that can serve the interests of the widest range of constituencies.

### *Types of Mobilisation*

We can identify several kinds of civil society activities related to peace, governance, human rights and other mobilisation for social progress and change.

1. *Primary mobilisation.* This consists of the mobilisation of multiple grass-roots organisations and constituencies; the mass mobilisation of individuals in pursuit of what they see to be their own interests, or a wider moral cause. This 'primary mobilisation' is the core constituency for any truly effective peace-building. Their intimate and ongoing involvement is the key to the maintaining the relevance, moral determination, sensitivity and sense of accountability of such measures.
2. *Professional advocacy.* Advocacy organisations represent the 'second generation' of human rights activism. Advocacy in this sense has policy-oriented and adversarial components. Policy-oriented advocacy is the activism of professionals in the area who can bring the issue to the public eye, provide legal and policy expertise, and advise governments and international organisations. Adversarial advocacy is the investigation and documentation of cases of abuse, and the extent of abuse, in different countries; and the exposure ('naming and shaming') of governments that have turned a blind eye or worse to the practice. This includes bringing cases to court and providing legal aid to victims. Journalism and law are key professions in this kind of work.
3. *Material assistance.* Assistance agencies, ranging from local NGOs and community-based advice centres, to international NGOs, to UN organisations, to governmental donors, all have a role in building peace. Aid provision can be a vital part of peacebuilding and especially of the success of post-conflict transitions. However, a focus on resources also has its dangers, because it may lead to a neglect of the essential social and political activities that must underpin effective peace-related activities.
4. *Coalitions with concerned policymakers.* Sympathetic individuals in governments (legislature, executive and judiciary), and also in business, the UN, foundations, etc.,

must be key parts of any coalition concerned with peace. These ‘policymakers with a conscience’ are strategic allies in terms of enacting policy changes and taking key leadership decisions.

Justice Africa is a ‘secondary’ organisation, that seeks to be sensitive to the needs of ‘primary’ constituencies, while also linking up with other levels of organisation and activity.

### *Political Systems and Peace-making*

Civil society engagement with peace-related activities is necessarily constrained by the extent of political space in the country or countries concerned. As a general rule, the higher the level of militarisation in a society, the less the opportunity for civil society engagement with peacemaking that exists. War—whether civil conflict or inter-state war—tends to destroy or distort systems for political representation. A tolerant liberal government will become much more authoritarian when it is in war mode. Suddenly, dissent may be regarded as treason, or just a step away. Rebel groups and militias usually depend upon total loyalty for their political survival. However, war does not mean that there are no channels of communication, no opportunities for organisation and expression. Other socio-political structures remain intact, and some may even become strengthened. Hence, any state in one of the following categories is likely to shift towards a more repressive and authoritarian category, when it is afflicted by war.

The following categorisation runs from collapsed states to liberal democracies. For each case, we ask what kind of civil society is possible, and what it can do. Note that in this context, civil society includes civilian political parties, trade unions and other organised interest groups, as well as NGOs and community-based organisations.

One significance of this categorisation for Justice Africa is that it points to the facilitative and supportive roles that can be played by outside organisations, as well as their occasional capacity for direct intervention in peacemaking.

Category one is *collapsed states*, with the absence of any effective governing authorities, including organised administration by militia groups or former rebel fronts. The opportunity for any form of civil mobilisation is very limited, and will probably be confined to local NGOs seeking to protect and assist displaced people, perhaps with help from international donors. No organised political representation is possible.

This draws attention to the fact that in most situations of armed conflict, the primary need for any individual is security and survival. These needs are best met by seeking the protection of a party to the conflict, which in turn means not mobilising in any manner that may challenge that party. Where the conflict has a regional or ethnic dimension, these loyalties may become by far the most important organising principle, so that individuals are uninterested in promoting their interests as women, youth, or other social categories, and instead identify with the political and military struggle. Those who resist this identification may be branded as ‘traitors’ and crushed.

However, we must not place all conflict-affected countries in this bracket, with the implication that nothing can be done. This is for several reasons. First, countries at war may still have civil politics in one form or another, especially in the capital city. For example, Sudan had a functioning parliamentary system during 1986-9, despite being at war. Despite the current war and collapsed state in the D.R. Congo, the city of Kinshasa continues to have civil space and political activities by parties and individuals. Second, the warring parties themselves differ greatly in terms of their internal organisation. While some are highly authoritarian and may even be the personal fiefdoms of their leaders, others have the capacity

for civil administration and the implementation of social programmes, that may actually promote the emancipation of marginalised groups such as women. In addition, in some countries with collapsed states, some areas may be peaceful, and civil organisation around NGOs or grassroots organisations may be possible. Many parts of Somalia are like this. However, in other cases, there is such a widespread breakdown of the socio-political order that any form of organised representation of interest groups is impossible.

In such a situation, external linkages are essential to any form of effective mobilisation of constituencies in search of peace. Such external linkages can either facilitate peace or sustain conflict—we are all familiar with the phenomenon of external aid resources or other interventions helping to support belligerents. If external actors are to play a positive role, they require both a very high level of information and analysis, and effective linkages to grassroots constituencies.

Category two is *personal rule or arbitrary rule*. This characterises some governments, and many armed groups. Policies are unstable; political activity is focused on taking or retaining power and enriching those in power. Groups such as women and the poor have few or no political options, and effective public policies are improbable and if they do occur, they are unlikely to last long. Again, those who challenge the authority of the government or anti-government group may find themselves crushed. Even raising alternative agendas and viewpoints may be politically and personally dangerous.

Some slender options for mobilisation to represent civil interests offer themselves in such cases. First, there may be a small opening for organising groups in a solidarity mode, and those groups may then move on to undertake other forms of advocacy in a discreet way. But, when challenged or fearing challenges, such groups must always put their solidarity with the dominant political force above any other consideration.

Second, using external linkages may be an option, if used carefully. That is, a group will seek the protection of an international organisation, or will build a coalition with an exile or expatriate organisation, in order to press their case. Alternatively, the initiative may come from diaspora groups, who enjoy the silent support of people inside the country. The interests of women, or youth, or certain ethnic groups, will then be represented by leaders who are outside the country or who have positions or influence in international NGOs. These leaders may of course develop their own agendas, or may not effectively serve their constituencies—but in the absence of opportunities for the mobilisation of the group in question internally, there may be no other mechanism for making their voices heard. The influence of such groups is likely to be marginal.

This type of mobilisation will be effective in proportion to the weakness of the ruling authority. When that authority is weak—it has few resources and needs international respectability—then it may concede space for independent groups to operate, if doing so is its only means to gaining access to international resources. However, should the authority obtain its own sources of income, it is likely to squeeze that small space for civil action.

Lastly, if the government or opposition represents a coalition, then there will be political space provided by the differences between the coalition partners. A coalition entails a forum for discussion between the different party leaders. Any such forum is also an opening for civil groups to make their voices heard. Once again, managing this without falling foul of the parties will demand skill, sensitivity and patience.

Category three is *institutionalised government with limited political freedoms* and minimal pluralism (either left-wing, right-wing or simply authoritarian). Governments or (more rarely) opposition fronts may be able to run effective administrations and deliver social services. Many former liberation movements, now in power, fit into this model—though some cases may degenerate into personal rule.

In such situations there are much greater possibilities for the mobilisation of interest groups. Where the authorities have a broadly leftist political programme, it may be easy for them to respond to some demands from women, youth, the poor and other social constituencies. Mass organisations may have some autonomy which can be used to push the interests of their constituents. Under right-wing authorities, it is possible that religiously-based groups may be able to mobilise and represent interests. It is possible that there will be international NGO involvement in service provision, which increases opportunities for stakeholders to make alliances with external groups. However the authorities' response is likely to be top-down, and the institutional mechanisms whereby these groups are given some political representation are likely to be dominated by the political apparatus.

Former liberation movements pose the additional problem that they have often politicised very wide sections of society, so that the boundaries between party, state and society become blurred. Political orientation and ideology may pervade not only the activities of a vanguard party, but the civil service, the army, academia and business as well.

In such circumstances, internal constituencies may take the lead in mobilising stakeholders, but only for limited agendas. Once again, we will find that civil groups are likely to define their primary loyalty to the political cause, and use this as a platform for pressing for their specific interest. Meanwhile external groups—either international organisations or expatriate or exile groups—may still play a crucial role, because they can provide an arena for more open debate and discussion of alternatives, that may be impossible within the limited political space available internally.

In such circumstances, civil groups can mobilise for peace, but only indirectly. Some may adopt a formal agenda for 'peace', but on examination their loyalty to one or other belligerent party means that they really mean 'peace through victory.' Others may seek peace indirectly by promoting local reconciliation within limited localities, or by developing independent civil society organisations in the small niches available. But civil groups will be able to openly call for peace only when the party that protects them endorses that call.

The fourth and final category is *institutionalised government with political pluralism*. These are stable and mature democratic states with legitimate organisations and civil and political rights. They normally provide a wide range of welfare services, and there is much debate and scrutiny of service provision. Interest groups have the scope to organise, though other axes of political mobilisation (such as ethnicity) may dominate. Groups that are otherwise invisible politically (e.g. the handicapped, very small ethnic minorities) may find a voice. There are myriad opportunities for promoting the interests and mobilisation of women, youth and other groups. International networking by these groups is possible and can be done in an open manner.

It is rare for such a government to be involved in a protracted armed conflict, internally or with a neighbour. However, there are transitional cases in which either or both government and opposition are engaged in open public debate about peace, creating a space in which pro-peace constituencies can organise. Where the government or opposition consists of a broad coalition with different political agendas, this political space is more likely.

Under these sorts of government, there is the possibility for a genuine 'peace movement' that is independent of government or military opposition, and brings real political pressure for peace to bear on the parties.

The above categorisation underlines how it is inherently difficult for civil society groups to mobilise when their need to do so is greatest. It emphasises how the interests of stakeholder groups may be primarily linked to ethnic, regional or political affiliations, on which survival and security depend in the short term. It draws attention to the strategies that such groups are likely to follow.

The primary identification is likely to be with the major agenda of one of the parties to the conflict, because of ethnic, religious, political and regional allegiance and because of the need for physical security. Only when the political tension relaxes, for example in the context of hopeful peace negotiations, will it be possible for cross-cutting allegiances to be mobilised. (This implies that civil society can mobilise for peace only when peace is already on the agenda of the principal belligerents.) A variant of this occurs when a group may work within the institutions set up by one of the parties, trying to test the autonomy of that institution (e.g. a women's organisation or a humanitarian agency). Another variant occurs when an independent group may be in solidarity with one of the parties, with also an ulterior agenda of promoting the rights of specific interest groups. Thus, a women's organisation may seek to promote the rights of women within a particular party or the territory it controls.

All groups will be extremely cautious in undertaking any visible mobilisation in a way that challenges the warring party under whose authority they reside. A group with an existing constituency in the area—for example a church organisation—will be very cautious in protecting the interests of its constituents, by seeking not to offend the controlling party. But, under certain circumstances, it may be ready to advocate boldly and publicly, confident that its combination of local constituency and international linkages will provide some protection.

Groups may utilise external links with international NGOs and exile groups in order to promote their particular interest and point of view, or to create a space in which wider issues such as peace can be discussed openly.

Historically, the most successful social movements have consisted of a coalition between the 'primary mobilisation' of constituencies—the mass mobilisation of people in pursuit of their own rights and interests—and the 'secondary activism' of professionals, who can use the tools of publicity, the law, and international alliance-building to lead such movements. Africa has had few of these successful primary-secondary coalitions. The non-violent independence movement in the 1950s and 1960s was one case. The anti-Apartheid movement was a variant on the theme. The short-lived civil coalition that overthrew the Nimeiri dictatorship in Sudan in April 1985 was another. The pro-democracy movements of the late 1980s and the sovereign national conferences of Francophone countries in the early 1990s were another encouraging case. But it is very rare in Africa (as indeed elsewhere in the world) for there to be a mass peace movement in a country that is at war, especially when the war is close to home. For reasons outlined above, peace movements are easily divided or manipulated, and it takes remarkably courageous individuals to resist the taunts of 'traitor' that will be leveled by one side or the other.

Certain categories of people—including women, young people and the poor and marginalised—have particular interests in peace. But they are also categories of people whom it is difficult to mobilise as such. They have more interests that divide them and few natural structures for organisation and authority, implying that any mobilisation will probably be transient.

## **Conclusion**

There is no blueprint for engagement in conflict resolution or post-conflict transitions. Each case demands its own moral and political judgement, based on an intimate knowledge of the country concerned, and commitment to a particular national process of peace-making with all its corollaries. Model-making is an intrinsically hazardous enterprise in this area. However, we are in a position to make some generalisations, and this paper has sought to sketch them and draw out some of their implications.

This paper has outlined some of the complexities involved in peacemaking. There is no one-model fits all scenario. Peace activities demand actions at a range of different levels, and linkages between these different levels. Different kinds of organisations, movements and actors are required.

Organisations that operate at regional and subregional levels, whether intergovernmental or civil society, can be seen to have a key role in peace related activities. They can have a comparative advantage in terms of analytically synthesising the different components of peace-related activities, identifying gaps, and working towards greater coherence between them.